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Income shifting from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions is considered a primary method of 
reducing worldwide tax burdens of multinational firms. Extant research generally makes the 
high-tax and low-tax distinctions using statutory or aggregated tax rates. However, current losses 
also affect income-shifting incentives. We extend prior approaches to allow for the inclusion of 
unprofitable affiliates and test whether the unexpected profit of unprofitable affiliates deviates 
from the negative association with tax incentives observed in profitable affiliates. Results 
suggest that multinational firms alter the distribution of reported profits to take advantage of 
losses. Our point estimate for profitable affiliates implies that an increase of one standard 
deviation in the tax rate incentives of an affiliate with average return on assets of 13.3 is 
associated with a lower return on assets of 0.5 percentage points. The same tax incentive of an 
unprofitable affiliate is associated with an increase in its return on assets of approximately 0.7 
percentage points, holding assets, labor, productivity and other factors constant. We further 
document a larger responsiveness to rates between profitable and unprofitable affiliates in high-
tax jurisdictions, consistent with predictions. 
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Prior research in accounting, finance, and economics finds that firms undertake a strategy 
of shifting income out of high-tax jurisdictions into low-tax jurisdictions, thus reporting lower 
profit in high-tax affiliates and higher profit in low-tax affiliates.1 In a multinational firm with 
only profitable affiliates, this shifting strategy results in tax savings equal to the dollars of 
income shifted times the rate differential between the affiliates, net of any costs. 
Researchers generally determine intra-firm tax incentives using either the statutory tax 
rate or an aggregated effective tax rate. These methods mask an alternative tax-saving recipient 
of shifted income: an unprofitable, or loss, affiliate. Ignoring the potential benefit of loss 
carryback, a loss affiliate potentially becomes a temporary, low-tax-rate affiliate because it can 
have a marginal tax rate much lower than the statutory tax rate. As a result, a firm may shift less 
income out of an affiliate with a loss than would be expected if the affiliate were profitable. With 
more aggressive tax planning, a firm may even shift income from profitable affiliates into loss 
affiliates, reporting lower profit in the profitable affiliates and smaller losses in the loss affiliates.  
An income shifting strategy that exploits the lower tax rates of loss affiliates is costly. 
Efficient transfer pricing strategies can be expensive to put in place and thus are often set over a 
multi-year period. Moving income to benefit from a loss affiliate necessitates new transactions, 
re-characterizing the nature of existing transactions, or reorganizing the global supply chain.2 
Each of these requires creation of supporting documentation, procurement of professional 
services/advice, and/or a reduction in the probability of sustaining a position on audit. Further, 
																																								 																				
1 See for example, Collins, Kemsley and Lang (1998); Klassen, Lang and Wolfson (1993); Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006); Huizinga and Laeven (2008); Weichenrieder (2009); Klassen and Laplante (2012); Dharmapala and Riedel 
(2013); Dharmapala (2014); and Dyreng and Markle (2015).  
2	Transfer pricing is the price multinational groups set for intercompany transfers of intangible goods, services, 
rights to exploit intellectual property, and debt (Singh and Mathur 2013). Transfer pricing is an important 
mechanism by which multinational groups shift income across jurisdictions in response to tax incentives. We 
acknowledge that we do not directly observe intercompany transfers but rather follow the literature cited above that 
infers income-tax motivated transfer prices from the relation between tax incentives and unexpected profit. 	
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affiliate losses may be short lived as the affiliate often returns to profitability or ceases 
operation.3 Finally, though firms must consider both the current and the projected tax-paying 
status of each affiliate when they implement an income shifting strategy, predicting the future 
tax-paying status is more difficult for loss affiliates than for profitable affiliates. Whether the tax 
savings from this strategy outweigh the costs necessary to deviate from the “traditional” high-tax 
to low-tax income shifting strategy examined in prior work is an empirical question. 
Our paper uses affiliate-level data on multinational firms to explore responses to the 
income shifting incentives generated by loss affiliates.4 To include loss affiliates in the 
traditional logged Cobb-Douglas profit prediction model, we measure profitability as return on 
assets plus one.5 We estimate a model that specifies affiliate profitability as a function of labor, 
assets, productivity, age, macroeconomic and industry-level shocks, and tax-related factors on a 
sample that includes loss affiliates.  
We first examine the relation between affiliates’ pre-tax earnings and the composite tax 
incentive variable, C, developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). The relation between profit and 
tax incentives is expected to be negative in the presence of income shifting (Hines and Rice, 
1994). Consistent with prior literature using only profitable affiliates, we estimate an increase of 
one percent in a profitable affiliate’s composite tax incentive is associated with a 0.75 percent 
decrease in reported profitability on the mean ROA.  
Despite potential costs to altering the transfer pricing strategy to exploit losses, we 
hypothesize that this relation will be less negative, or even positive, for affiliates with losses. 
																																								 																				
3 It is possible for a multinational to continue to operate an affiliate with structural losses due to strategic or other 
reasons. However, one would expect this to be rare because structural losses are costly to the global firm.  
4 Consistent with many income shifting studies, we use reported book (financial statement) income as a proxy for 
taxable income (Claessens and Laeven 2004; De Simone 2016; Dharmapala and Riedel 2013; Hines and Rice 1994; 
Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Klassen, Lang and Wolfson 1993; Klasssen and Laplante 2012; Markle 2015). 
5 Claessens and Laeven (2004) also adopt this transformation of the traditional logged Cobb-Douglas profit 
prediction model in order to include unprofitable banks in their cross-jurisdictional study of bank competition. We 
examine the effect of this choice below. 
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Consistent with that expectation, we estimate a positive coefficient on the interaction of the 
composite tax incentive variable and an indicator for current period loss. Further, we estimate 
that an increase of one percent in the composite tax incentive of loss affiliates is associated with 
a 1.24 percent increase in profitability on average. Thus, we show that the overall relation 
between tax incentives and pre-tax earnings for loss affiliates is positive, consistent with a 
strategy of shifting profits to loss affiliates, on average.  
However, we note a couple of limitations with the composite tax variable. First, it 
requires information on all affiliates of a multinational corporation to be complete. Second, it is 
especially susceptible to omitted information about low-tax affiliates, such as loss or tax haven 
affiliates. Given these concerns, we repeat our above analysis using the statutory tax rate and 
estimate similar results. Specifically, our point estimates of semi-elasticities imply that on 
average a one percent increase in the statutory tax rate of a profitable affiliate is associated with a 
0.62 percent decrease reported profitability, and the same change in the statutory tax rate for a 
loss affiliate is associated with a 0.70 percent increase in reported profitability. These two sets of 
tests provide support for our hypothesis that the reported profit of loss affiliates exhibits a 
different relation with tax incentives than does the reported profit of profitable affiliates. 
We next consider the subset of affiliates we expect to alter their transfer prices the most. 
In cases where the costs are very high or the benefits are very low, the firm’s global tax benefits 
of altering the income shifting will not exceed the costs. A low-tax loss affiliate is expected to 
receive shifted income under both the traditional and “shift-to-loss” strategies.6 Incentives to 
receive additional shifted income will result in a small benefit to the global firm. A loss affiliate 
in a high tax-rate country, in contrast, is expected to provide shifted income in a traditional 
																																								 																				
6 We use the term “shift-to-loss” to indicate transfer pricing that is altered in the presence of, or upon the expectation 
of, a loss affiliate. As described above, a shift-to-loss strategy could involve shifting profit from a profitable affiliate 
to a loss affiliate or shifting less profit out of an affiliate that is expected to experience a loss.  
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strategy but receive shifted income in a shift-to-loss strategy. Providing an additional recipient of 
shifted income will provide a larger benefit to the global firm. Comparing reported profit under a 
shift-to-loss strategy with reported profit under a traditional strategy, we expect that the 
strengthening of existing incentives in low-tax affiliates will be less disruptive (less costly) but 
also less beneficial than the sign change of incentives in high-tax affiliates. Thus, we hypothesize 
that the level of the underlying tax rate alters the magnitude of the relation between unexpected 
profit and the tax incentive for loss affiliates. We separate affiliates by the magnitude of their 
jurisdictions’ statutory tax rate and test whether the difference in responsiveness of unexpected 
losses to the tax incentive is more pronounced for loss affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions than 
those in low-tax jurisdictions. Results confirm that the responsiveness of unexpected profits to 
the tax incentives of low-tax loss affiliates are significantly less negative than that of low-tax 
profitable affiliates, and the difference in responsiveness between profitable and loss affiliates is 
even greater for affiliates located in high-tax rate jurisdictions. That the difference in response 
between profitable and loss affiliates is increasing in the jurisdictions’ tax rates supports our 
second hypothesis. 
Finally, we explore in more detail the effect of loss affiliates within a corporate group. 
Specifically, we estimate the relation between profitability and tax incentives for three groups of 
affiliate-years based on both the profit status of the affiliate and of their affiliated group 
members. The three groups are profitable affiliates in firms in which all affiliates are profitable, 
profitable affiliates in firms in which some affiliates report losses, and loss affiliates. As above, 
we estimate an overall positive coefficient on the interaction between loss and tax incentives for 
loss affiliates. We further estimate that profitable affiliates with at least one loss affiliate in their 
affiliated group report profit that is less negatively related to their tax incentives than do 
profitable affiliates in an entirely profitable affiliate group. This is consistent with firms altering 
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their traditional response to income-shifting incentives in the presence of loss-making affiliates 
and provides further evidence that the existence of loss affiliates disrupts the traditional pattern 
of income shifting. 
This paper is in the spirit of Gramlich, Limpaphayom, and Rhee (2004) and Onji and 
Vera (2010), who both study income shifting among Japanese keiretsu members. Both papers 
document a lower incidence of losses in affiliated members relative to unaffiliated members, 
suggesting affiliated groups band together to save keiretsu-level income taxes.7 We contribute to 
this literature by using a cross-border setting that allows us to exploit variation in tax rates and 
heterogeneous affiliate tax characteristics to incorporate loss affiliates into a composite tax rate 
variable. Importantly, we are the first to use a cross-border sample to test tax-motivated shift-to-
loss income shifting and thus are the first to document that the presence of loss affiliates affects 
the reported profitability of affiliated firms.  
This study informs policy makers who, in light of increased multinational income shifting 
and the recent economic downturn, are debating how to curb tax base erosion and profit shifting 
(OECD, 2013; Saint-Amans and Russo, 2013). Our results suggest that, upon exam, revenue 
authorities consider both affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions and affiliates in jurisdictions or 
industries experiencing losses as potential recipients of the profits they hope to recover. Also, our 
study provides evidence that firms will respond to even temporary tax-minimizing opportunities 
despite non-trivial costs, which contributes to policy maker analyses of altering tax policies 
targeted at multinational corporations, such as repatriation tax holidays, temporary tax incentives 
for foreign direct investors, and patent boxes.  
																																								 																				
7 This result is also consistent with risk sharing if profitable affiliates absorb unfavorable outcomes of loss members, 
rather than profitable members using the tax losses of unprofitable members. Kim and Yi (2006) document earnings 
management in affiliated Korean firms (“chaebols”), consistent with risk-sharing-motivated income shifting. 
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Furthermore, our results inform public economists regarding the semi-elasticity of 
reported income to changes in tax rates. Our paper suggests that, by using samples of only 
profitable affiliates, previous estimates of the magnitudes of income shifting in response to tax 
rate changes should be considered a lower bound.8 Some shifting by profitable affiliates goes to 
loss affiliates, rather than to low-tax profitable affiliates. Additionally, because losses are 
expected to be transitory in general (Hayn, 1995; Frankel and Litov, 2009), the incentives to shift 
to a loss affiliate would be less affected than by a change in the statutory tax rate. Thus, previous 
estimates generated using only profitable affiliates include both these the muted responses to tax 
rate differences. Our analysis demonstrates that the semi-elasticity for profitable affiliates 
increases from 0.81 to 1.50 when the presence of loss affiliates is fully considered.   
Our results also inform researchers who should consider the impact of this alternative 
tax-reducing transfer pricing strategy. Many income shifting studies use aggregated affiliate 
profits and losses (i.e., consolidated financial statement data), which confounds the two types of 
income shifting strategies by combining a number of potentially-conflicting transfer pricing 
incentives. Other income shifting studies restrict their sample to profitable observations.9 The 
removal of loss affiliates does not fully address the concern, though, because the effect of 
shifting to these affiliates is also reflected in the responsiveness of profitable affiliates to their tax 
incentives. Our supplemental tests show a significant difference in response between profitable 
affiliates without a loss affiliate and profitable affiliates with a loss affiliate. 
Finally, this study deepens our understanding of the income shifting practices of 
multinational firms. Examining a new and economically significant income shifting setting helps 
																																								 																				
8 Results in the concurrent working paper Hopland, Lisowsky, Mardan and Schindler (2014), who examine levels of 
payments between affiliated firms in Norway, also support an understatement of sensitivity of transfer prices to tax 
rate changes in prior literature. 
9 For example, Power and Silverstein (2007) excludes unprofitable US parents and Blouin, Robinson and Seidman 
(2015), De Simone (2016), and Markle (2015) exclude unprofitable affiliates. 
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answer the call in Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) to increase our ability to explain and predict 
income-shifting strategies. Additionally, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) point out that researchers 
understand little about how the existence of a loss affects firm behavior. Our results suggest that 
firms alter their transfer prices to take advantage of losses and that affiliates in high-tax 
jurisdictions experience a more significant alteration than do affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions.  
 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
Income Shifting Background 
The most effective income shifting strategies employ two components in concert with 
each other: an operational decision and an accounting decision. The operational decision entails 
tax-efficiently structuring the firm’s global supply chain to strategically locate the affiliated 
parties to major intercompany transactions. As such, multinationals often locate high-return 
assets and activities in low-tax jurisdictions and low-return activities in high-tax jurisdictions.10 
Further, multinationals have incentives to choose prices for these intercompany 
transactions that optimize the worldwide tax burden of the firm; this represents the accounting 
decision component. Transfer pricing guidelines for income tax reporting are established by the 
OECD, and have been adopted in some form by most European countries. These regulations 
prescribe that for the purposes of calculating taxable income, any intercompany prices for goods, 
services and intangibles should be those that would have been realized if the parties were 
unrelated, known as the “arm’s length principle” (OECD, 2010). However, these arm’s length 
prices can be difficult to observe, especially for services, unique intangibles, and unusual or 
																																								 																				
10 Examples of high-return activities include the research and development of unique intangibles. Examples of low-
return activities include contract manufacturing and limited-risk distribution. Interestingly, the OECD explicitly 
excludes these types of tax-motivated location decisions from its definition of base erosion and profit shifting, or 
BEPS (OECD 2015, 42). They define profit shifting as the movement of taxable profits away from the jurisdiction 
in which the economic activity generating those profits are located. 
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unfinished products (PWC, 2006). This inability to always find exact market price matches for 
intercompany transactions leaves multinational entities some discretion in setting transfer prices. 
Further, although many multinationals strive to appropriately price a transaction during the 
course of the year, they can also make so-called “topside adjustments” to these prices after the 
financial books have been closed but prior to the filing of the tax return.11 Thus, the accounting 
decision for how and when to set the transfer price of an intercompany transaction is flexible and 
relatively nimble when compared to the operational decision. 
When a multinational firm anticipates an affiliate will earn a loss, the multinational has a 
number of options to consider. First, the affiliate could simply report the loss as earned under its 
existing transfer-pricing strategy. If its jurisdiction allows loss carryback and it was profitable 
during the allowed carryback period, the reported loss will generate an immediate refund. If its 
jurisdiction does not allow loss carryback (or if it was not profitable during the allowed 
carryback period) but does allow loss carryforward, the reported loss will generate tax savings in 
the future if the affiliate returns to profitability. If the jurisdiction of the reported loss does not 
allow loss carryback or loss carryforward, the reported loss generates no tax benefit for the 
multinational firm. Thus, both the adjustment costs and the benefits are lowest under this option. 
Second, in certain jurisdictions, the multinational firm may be able to consolidate across 
borders to allow a loss in one jurisdiction to offset profit in another jurisdiction. For example, 
France and Denmark have long-standing cross border consolidation policies with other EU 
member states. However, due to system limitations such as long lock-in periods and the inability 
																																								 																				
11 Because we rely on affiliate financial statement information, we are unable to measure the impact of these topside 
adjustments. However, topside adjustments bias against our tests detecting income shifting behavior.  
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to selectively consolidate only certain affiliates, few multinational companies take advantage of 
them.12 This suggests that use of current cross border consolidation policies is very costly.  
Third, the multinational firm can undertake real activities at the affiliate to minimize the 
loss.13 For example, the multinational could move research and development activities to a more 
profitable affiliate or, as a more extreme example, move a physical factory from one jurisdiction 
to another. This option likely entails significant adjustment costs and will result in a less tax-
efficient structure in the future, assuming the affiliate returns to profitability.  
Finally, the multinational can adjust transfer prices to minimize the reported loss. 
Because transfer prices have some inherent flexibility, a multinational could potentially reduce 
taxes using a traditional strategy when all affiliates are profitable, but alter this strategy—to a 
shift-to-loss strategy—when losses occur in some affiliates. While this option is more costly than 
the first option (i.e., no response), adjusting transfer prices also generates new tax savings, 
except in the case that the losses are carried back. This is the behavior we aim to study.  
The inherent flexibility in transfer prices arises because market prices for intercompany 
transactions can be difficult to observe. Firms generally construct a range of prices based on 
inexact “comparables,” or companies with a similar business profile. Most countries will not 
challenge any well-supported price within the range generated using such methods, and as such, 
firms often choose the most tax-favored endpoint of the range.  
For example, firms with a high-tax affiliate that is purchasing services from a low-tax 
affiliate will choose a price at the high end of the range to minimize profits in the relatively high-
tax jurisdiction and maximize profits in the relatively low-tax jurisdiction. If the high-tax affiliate 
																																								 																				
12 For example, through 2005, only 13 French companies had opted for cross border consolidation (Dorsey & 
Whitney LLP, 2006). 
13 We assume that the aggregate level of the multinational’s activities was optimal but that its allocation of these 
activities to affiliates was not. Thus, in our setting, activities are moved rather than increased or decreased. 
10 
	
instead earns a loss, it has several options. First, and least costly, the firm can keep the previous 
price. Second, the firm can choose a transfer price at the other end of the range to minimize the 
reported loss. Third, the firm can search for additional or a new set of independent comparable 
transactions in order to expand the range to include a more favorable endpoint. This change will 
require some new documentation to support the new range. Finally, if necessary, the firm can 
identify risks that resulted in the loss (e.g., foreign currency exchange or product failure risk), or 
other previously uncompensated transactions that the affiliate is party to, and compensate the 
loss affiliate for that previously un-priced contribution. However, this last option potentially sets 
a precedent for less tax-favored outcomes in profitable years. Which response the firm will 
choose will depend on the tax savings and the costs associated with each alternative. 
Related Literature 
The literature abounds with evidence that firms reduce income taxes by shifting taxable 
income from relatively higher-tax jurisdictions to lower-tax jurisdictions. Grubert and Mutti 
(1991) exploit the relation between profitability and the tax rate as a measure of income shifting 
and variants of their research design are often used in the literature. Klassen, Lang, and Wolfson 
(1993) use a similar methodology to study changes in income shifting behavior in response to tax 
rate changes, while Hines and Rice (1994) employ the research design to study the use of tax 
havens. The approach of Hines and Rice has become common as a general model of 
multinational income shifting (Dharmapala, 2014). 
Alternative methods for studying tax-motivated income shifting behavior have also been 
developed. Jacob (1996) considers the volume of intrafirm trade as a measure of income shifting 
flexibility and shows that tax savings are related to the volume of intrafirm trade. Clausing 
(2006) finds that the price of intrafirm transactions and trading partners’ tax rates are strongly 
related in a manner consistent with tax-motivated transfer pricing. Overesch (2006) uses 
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intercompany accounts receivable (A/R) to indirectly measure intrafirm prices and shows that the 
intercompany A/R of foreign-owned German subsidiaries with a loss carryforward is less 
sensitive to the tax rate differential (between the foreign parent and German subsidiary) than is 
the intercompany A/R of foreign-owned German subsidiaries without a loss carryforward. 
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2008) find that the prices that U.S. exporters charge arm’s-length 
customers are significantly higher than the prices that they charge related-parties, and that this 
price wedge is greater for exports to countries with lower tax rates or with higher import tariffs. 
While there is ample evidence of tax-motivated income shifting by multinational firms, 
the literature has largely focused on the benefit of shifting income from higher-tax affiliates to 
lower-tax affiliates and ignored the benefit of shifting income from a profitable affiliate to a loss 
affiliate.14 Because the presence of a loss affiliate can alter the income shifting incentives of 
relatively low-tax profitable affiliates, this omission may have a profound effect on measurement 
of income shifting. Although Klassen et al. (1993) discuss the difficulty in measuring the tax 
incentives of unprofitable firms and the potential confounding effect losses have on tax-
motivated income shifting behavior, to our knowledge, only Gramlich et al. (2004) and Onji and 
Vera (2010) attempt to test the effect of loss affiliates on reported profits.15  
Both Gramlich et al. (2004) and Onji and Vera (2010) find that members of Japanese 
keiretsu groups (member firms) appear to alter their transfer pricing behaviors in the presence of 
loss members. Although these results support loss-related income shifting, their data sets do not 
																																								 																				
14 Much of the tax-motivated income shifting research excludes unprofitable foreign affiliates or unprofitable 
foreign groups from analysis. However, excluding unprofitable affiliates does not avoid the influence of losses 
because the effect of loss affiliates should be reflected in the profitability of profitable affiliates, which often remain 
in the sample. Additionally, research that is only able to measure aggregated foreign versus domestic income, rather 
than that of specific affiliates, treats the income-shifting incentives of loss affiliates the same as those of profitable 
affiliates.	
15 Overesch (2006 and 2009) tangentially discusses the potential effects of losses on tax-motivated income shifting 
but does not explicitly investigate the impact of losses on inferences. While the literature on risk-sharing (for 
example, Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Yafeh, 2005; and Kim and Yi, 2006) inherently studies the effects of 
loss affiliates on affiliated groups, it primarily does so from a non-tax angle. 	
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allow the variation in tax rates necessary to directly study the relation between tax rates and 
profitability. Further, the costs and benefits of shifting income between keiretsu members will 
differ from those associated with foreign affiliates in a commonly-controlled group.  
In a concurrent study that complements ours, Hopland et al. (2014) examine the levels of 
intercompany payments between affiliated firms in Norway in the presence of affiliates with a 
loss, finding that some transfer prices are flexible enough to mitigate affiliate losses. 
Specifically, they document that loss affiliates exhibit lower net outgoing transfer payments 
relative to profitable affiliates, and that this reduction appears to stem from intercompany 
transfers for intangibles (rather than tangible goods or debt) via topside, tax-only adjustments.16 
Our study increases the external validity of their findings by extending the analysis to a 
multinational setting, allowing an identification strategy that exploits differences in tax 
incentives across multinational groups and jurisdictions. Our study further differs by estimating 
tax-motivated income shifting from reported book profits, which are more widely available. We 
provide evidence that the reported book profits of multinational firms also respond to affiliated 
losses, suggesting that multinational groups respond quickly to affiliate losses and book shift-to-
loss transfer prices throughout the year rather than relying only on topside, tax-only adjustments.  
While the tax-motivated income shifting literature has largely ignored the impact of 
losses on cross-jurisdictional income shifting, the effect of losses on other types of tax efficient 
behavior has been studied. For example, Mackie-Mason (1990) finds that firms with loss 
carryforwards are significantly less likely to issue debt than firms without loss carryforwards. 
More recently, Edgerton (2010) shows that firms with loss carryforwards elect bonus 
depreciation less frequently than fully taxable firms. In addition, De Simone, Robinson, and 
																																								 																				
16 These types of adjustments are made to tax accounts only and are made after the financial books are closed but 
before the tax return is filed. We are unable to observe these tax-only adjustments. 
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Stomberg (2014) provide evidence that firms are less likely to be tax aggressive if they have 
significant loss carryforwards. These papers estimate that losses significantly affect the tax-
related decisions studied, suggesting that their effect on transfer pricing is worth studying. 
We connect these two lines of literature by more directly studying the impact of losses on 
cross-jurisdictional tax-motivated income shifting behavior. To do so, we develop a method to 
estimate the expected income of loss affiliates. We then examine the relation between 
unexplained profits and the benefits of employing a shift-to-loss strategy. Our work differs from 
the above studies because we posit that losses alter the tax planning strategy rather than simply 
lessening the tax planning incentives. In that sense, our approach is more like Erickson, 
Heitzman, and Zhang (2012) and Maydew (1997) who find evidence of tax-motivated inter-
temporal loss shifting. 
 
III. DIFFERENCE IN INCOME SHIFTING WITH A LOSS AFFILIATE 
Model and Hypothesis 
In a multinational group consisting exclusively of profitable affiliates, the traditional 
strategy of shifting income from high-tax affiliates to low-tax affiliates reduces worldwide taxes. 
This paper suggests that the presence of loss affiliates temporarily confounds these traditional 
income shifting incentives both by providing high-tax profitable affiliates additional, potentially 
tax-minimizing recipients of shifted income and by altering the incentives of lower-tax affiliates. 
Essentially, loss affiliates face a reduced marginal tax rate, potentially zero. Low-tax affiliates 
continue to have an incentive to receive shifted income but now also have affiliates potentially 
facing a zero-tax rate to whom they can shift income.  
Hines and Rice (1994) develop a model in which each affiliate in a corporate group 
reports a pre-tax profit, πi, that is the sum of the pre-tax profit from the economic activity in the 
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affiliate, ρi, the amount of profit shifted into or out of the affiliate, ψi, and the cost of any 
shifting, . ψi would be positive for relatively low-tax affiliates and negative for 
relatively high-tax affiliates.17 Algebraically, this is represented as follows: 
  (1) 
 The Hines and Rice (1994) approach is in the spirit of the “all parties, all taxes, all costs” 
framework of Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1992) in that it attempts to separately identify the 
benefits and costs associated with shifting income to an affiliate. In equilibrium, the firm 
maximizes overall profit, which equals the sum of after-local-tax profits of all its affiliates. Hines 
and Rice (1994) assume profits will not face repatriation taxes and that total profits shifted 
among affiliates is constrained to be less than or equal to zero.  
Because Hines and Rice (1994) estimate their model at the jurisdiction level, aggregating 
the affiliates of all U.S. companies in the jurisdiction, they do not estimate the income shifted by 
a particular affiliate. Huizinga and Laeven (2008), however, use this same model to estimate the 
equilibrium shifting at the affiliate level. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) show that the equilibrium 





17 Empirically, we can only infer the affiliate’s net value of ψi. That is, an affiliate could both receive shifted profit 




























τi is the statutory tax rate of affiliate i in its jurisdiction. The fraction of the affiliate’s income that 
is shifted is based on the cost parameter, a, the affiliate’s statutory tax rate, τ, and the weighted 
average of the difference in the affiliate’s tax rate relative to each of the other affiliates’ tax rates. 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) note that C represents the tax incentive for a particular affiliate 
relative to others in its affiliated group in the same year. Higher values of C indicate a high-tax 
affiliate within its group, resulting in a tax incentive to shift profits to affiliates in the group with 
lower values of C.   
The Huizinga and Laeven (2008) model does not distinguish between profitable and loss 
affiliates, that is whether ρi is positive or negative. However, since the tax rate is typically the 
statutory tax rate and a negative value of ρi would yield a negative weight, empirical estimates 
based on this model employ only profitable firm-jurisdictions or profitable affiliates (e.g., 
Huizinga and Laeven 2008, De Simone 2016, Markle 2015). To analyze the equilibrium income 
shifting if affiliate j has losses, we examine the effect of a discrete decrease in the tax rate for 
affiliate j;18 that is, we assume losses will lower the net present value of taxes paid by the 
affiliate. To address the challenges that the above model faces in the presence of a loss affiliate, 
we make two changes to the cost of shifting. First, we replace pre-tax profit, ρi, as the driver of 
the cost of income shifting with Ki, where Ki represents economic activities such as capital or 
labor. This is done to avoid negative weights for loss affiliates and is consistent with recent 
proposals from the OECD that suggest that the level of economic activity in a jurisdiction 
determines how much profit is reasonable in that jurisdiction (OECD, 2013). Second, we model 
the cost of shifting as not tax deductible, consistent with an alternative specification considered 
																																								 																				
18 Throughout the remainder of this section, we denote the loss affiliate as affiliate j. 
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by Huizinga and Laeven (2008).19 Whether income-shifting costs are tax deductible is not a 
primary focus of this paper and this alteration simplifies the model with no effect to inferences. 




The partial derivative of the affiliate’s equilibrium shifted income, with respect to its tax 
incentive Ci is –Ki/a, and with respect to its tax rate, yields the following: 
 
(4) 
These derivatives are consistent with the standard negative relation between tax incentives and 
the profit reported in an affiliate, or more generally, in a jurisdiction.20 
If affiliate j suffers a loss, we assume that the loss affects the expected present value of 
the tax rate for this affiliate, which we denote θτj, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.21 We assume that the 
affiliate’s capital, and therefore its cost of shifting, are unaffected by the loss. The resulting 
																																								 																				
19 In their empirical estimates, Huizinga and Laeven (2008) use sales to proxy for ρ. With regard to deductibility, in 
footnote 5, the authors state that the specification in which costs are not tax deductible, as in equation (3) here, 
obtains quantitatively similar results to their main specification. Non-deductible costs of income shifting include 
centrally borne compliance costs (not charged out to the affiliate) as well as potential penalties. In robustness tests, 
we confirm that our results are robust to their calculation of C that assumes the costs of shifting are tax deductible. 
20	We assume the effect of the loss is to alter the present value of the statutory tax rate, rather than to alter the 
present value of the tax incentive variable C. Similar results are derived if the loss alters the affiliates value of C.  
21 A tax rate for loss affiliates of zero is consistent with either affiliates in jurisdictions that do not allow 
consolidation, loss carryback or loss carryforward, or with affiliates that do not have fact patterns that will provide a 
benefit when these provisions are allowed (i.e., no profitable affiliate with the same direct parent in the jurisdiction, 



































equilibrium shifting at the unprofitable affiliate j that results from the loss, relative to the 






1−θ( )C j  (5) 
where the shifting superscripts denote a loss, L, or profit, P. If this difference is positive, 
additional amounts are shifted to a loss affiliate, and thus the reported profits in a loss affiliate 
will be higher. The effect of the loss on the equilibrium relation between the affiliate’s tax 
















Thus, the difference in shifting behavior relative to the same affiliate if it reported profits is 
positively related to the tax incentive, and the degree to which it is positive increases as the 
affiliate’s tax rate goes to zero (i.e., as θ approaches 0). It is also worth noting that if θ = 0, the 
derivative of the amount shifting for the loss affiliate with respect to the tax rate (i.e., equation 
(6) plus equation (4)), is positive. 
The Appendix provides a numerical example of the effect of loss affiliates on income 
shifting. Given an assumed cost structure of income shifting (costs are quadratic, a = 10), this 
example demonstrates that when all affiliates are profitable, income is shifted into affiliates with 
low tax incentives. Specifically, in Case 1 of the Appendix, affiliate j receives 0.52 in income 
from the affiliates with high tax incentives, including affiliate k who shifts out 0.38 of income. In 
Case 2 of the Appendix, affiliates j and k experience losses and now both receive income, of 0.83 
and 0.53 respectively. Thus, the income-shifting pattern changes in equilibrium. Further, the 
effect of the difference in tax incentives between affiliates becomes much less significant in the 
presence of losses (difference in ψ between affiliates j and k of 0.9 in Case 1 vs. 0.3 in Case 2) 
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because high tax-incentive affiliates alter their income shifting to a much greater extent than low 
tax-incentive affiliates when the affiliates experience losses. That is, comparing Case 1 income 
shifting to Case 2 income shifting, the high tax-incentive affiliate changes from a provider of 
income to a recipient of income whereas the low tax-incentive affiliate alters its income shifting 
to a much smaller extent. The existence of the loss alters the traditional relation between 
unexpected profit and the tax incentive, which is the basis for our first hypothesis: 
H1: The relation between unexplained profit and the tax incentives is less negative for 
loss affiliates than for profitable affiliates. 
 
The above analysis does not consider the costs the company will bear to alter its income 
distribution strategy. Thus, our second hypothesis considers the cost-benefit trade-off a firm 
analyzes before deviating from a traditional income shifting strategy to adopt a shift-to-loss 
strategy. If the costs of altering the income shifting strategies are large enough, the costs will 
exceed the benefits for some affiliates. It will be most likely that benefits exceed costs for 
affiliates with high benefits.  
Holding θ constant, the worldwide tax savings due to adopting a shift-to-loss strategy are 
larger when the loss occurs in a higher tax rate loss affiliates than when the loss occurs in a lower 
tax rate loss affiliates. Said another way, the decrease in tax benefit due to θ (and thus the change 
in tax incentives due to θ) is increasing in the tax rate. The benefits of a shift-to-loss strategy in 
response to a high-tax loss affiliate will therefore be relatively larger, making it more likely, on 
average, that the benefits will exceed the costs.  
The Appendix provides a numerical example of this effect. Comparing income shifting, 
ψ, in Case 1 to Case 2, the high tax-incentive affiliate changes from a provider of income (ψ < 0) 
to a recipient of income (ψ > 0), whereas the low tax-incentive affiliate alters its income shifting 
to a much smaller extent (ψ > 0 in both cases). The last line of the example calculates the 
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difference in after-tax profit given a loss but using the traditional profit-shifting strategy in Case 
1 and the new optimal shift-to-loss strategy in Case 2, ignoring costs to change the shifting 
strategy. This line shows that the benefit obtained by shifting into the high tax-rate loss affiliate, 
k, is much larger than that obtained by shifting into the low tax-rate loss affiliate, j. Thus, on 
average, we would expect a stronger reaction to losses by affiliates in high tax-rate jurisdictions: 
H2: The relation between unexplained profit and the tax incentives is less negative for 
relatively higher tax rate loss affiliates than for relatively lower tax rate loss 
affiliates. 
 
Research Design and Variable Definitions 
To estimate their models, Hines and Rice (1994) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008) apply 
the Cobb-Douglas production function to estimate the profits associated with the economic 
activity in the jurisdiction.  
  (7) 
where ρ is the profit before shifting as in equation (1). Applying log transformations to both 
sides of equation (6) and incorporating equilibrium income shifting, as specified in the model 
above, yields the following estimation equation: 
  (8) 
where Ki is affiliate capital, Li is affiliate labor, Ai is a measure of productivity, and TIi is a 
measure of tax incentive for the affiliate, (e.g., the jurisdiction’s tax rate or C in Huizinga and 
Laeven, 2008). β5 is an empirical estimate of the average responsiveness to income-shifting 
incentives.22  
																																								 																				
22 Variation in explained profit associated with the tax rate of the foreign affiliate is attributed to either income 
shifting or implicit taxes. A negative coefficient on τi suggests that higher rates leads to lower profitability. This 
result is attributed to income shifting—firms report less taxable profit in higher tax jurisdictions and more taxable 
profit in lower tax jurisdictions to minimize income taxes. A positive coefficient on τi suggests that higher rates lead 
to higher profitability and is attributed to implicit taxes; under perfect competition, total costs should equalize so that 
jurisdictions with higher (lower) tax will have lower (higher) non-tax costs resulting in higher (lower) πi.  
( ) ueALKcLwQ 43231 ββββρ −=−≈
log π i = β1 +β2 log Ki +β3 log Li +β4 log Ai +β5 TIi +ui
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The model above is commonly used in the income shifting literature. However, it is not 
conducive to a study of loss affiliates because of its log specification. Claessens and Laeven 
(2004) avoid this limitation by specifying πi as return on assets (ROA) plus one. We employ this 
approach, scaling the production function in equation (7) by assets and adding one to the 
dependent variable before taking logs.23 This specification allows us to estimate our regressions 
on a sample that includes both profitable and unprofitable affiliates.  
We add to the model variables intended to capture economic factors that induce losses 
because the Cobb-Douglas production function assumes all factors of production and their 
effects on output are positive. We include a proxy for the age of the firm because the lifecycle of 
the firm affects the probability of loss. Significant changes in the local economy or industry 
(“shocks”) will affect reported profit, and thus we incorporate both a jurisdiction-year shock 
variable and country-industry-year shock variable. Finally, we add a binary variable to denote an 
unprofitable observation. Because the model below does not allow the tax rate to vary with 
profitability, it essentially estimates profit (or loss) given traditional income shifting incentives.  
ln(πi + 1) = β0 + β1*ln(TangibleAssetsit) + β2*ln(CompExpit) + β3*IndustryROAt + 
β4*Ageit + β5*∆GDPt + β6*∆MarketSizet + β7*TaxIncentiveit + β8*Lossit (9) 
 
We estimate this model on a sample of European affiliates. All variables are from the 
Amadeus database unless otherwise noted. Profit, πi, is ROA, computed as EBIT divided by total 
assets (TOAS). Following Huizinga and Laeven (2008), we proxy for capital using tangible fixed 
assets reported on the balance sheet (TFAS) and for labor using compensation expense reported 
on the income statement (STAF). Productivity is specified as IndustryROA, which is defined as 
the median ROA by two-digit NACE industry-country-year, calculated using all affiliated and 
independent firms. Age is year t less the first year the affiliate appears in the Amadeus database. 
																																								 																				
23 Scaling ρi in equation (7) by assets results in ROA on the left-hand-side of the equation. Scaling the right-hand-
side of equation (7) by assets changes the exponent on Ki from β2 to (β2 – 1). 
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The Shock variables we include are ΔGDP and ΔMktSize.24 ΔGDP is the percent change in 
country-year GDP per capita; GDP is as reported by the European Commission. ΔMktSize is the 
country-industry-year sum of all affiliate and standalone sales in year t less the sum in year t-1, 
scaled by 1,000,000.  
We alternatively measure TaxIncentive using an adaptation of C, the measure developed 
by Huizinga and Laeven (2008) to take into account the entire portfolio of tax rates faced by a 
firm, or the country-year statutory tax rate of the affiliate, STR. In our study, C represents a 
capital-weighted differential tax rate of the affiliate relative to all related firms in the same 
multinational group-year, as reflected in equation (3). To avoid multicollinearity when 
interactions are introduced, the affiliate-level tax rate variable STR is mean centered (Guenther 
and Sansing, 2010; Aiken and West, 1991).25 Loss equals one if EBIT is less than zero. The 
model described above, from which we derive our hypotheses, suggests that Loss should equal 1 
if ρ, the profits before shifting, are negative. In the main tests, we use the sign of EBIT as our 
empirical proxy for the sign of ρ; however, in specification checking procedures, we assess the 
sensitivity of our results to the proxy. All measures are calculated at the affiliate-year, firm-year, 
or country-industry-year level using Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database.  
To test hypothesis H1, we interact Loss with TaxIncentive, as below:  
ln(πi + 1) = β0 + β1*ln(TangibleAssetsit) + β2*ln(CompExpit) + β3*IndustryROAt + 
β4*Ageit + β5*∆GDPt + β6*∆MarketSizet + β7*TaxIncentiveit + β8*Lossit + 
β9*Lossit*TaxIncentiveit  (10) 
 
H1 predicts a positive coefficient for β9, consistent with equation (6).  
																																								 																				
24 We use median industry-country-year ROA as the measure of productivity instead of GDP because we include 
change in GDP as a proxy for economic shock. In untabulated tests, we also include the change in market share of 
the affiliate; however the coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant at conventional levels and so we 
exclude it from main tests. 
25 By construction, C is effectively mean-centered within firm. 
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To test hypothesis H2, we add an indicator variable for whether the affiliate-year is in the 
top quartile of STR for that year:26 
ln(πi + 1) = β0 + β1*ln(TangibleAssetsit) + β2*ln(CompExpit) + β3*IndustryROAt + 
β4*Ageit + β5*∆GDPt + β6*∆MarketSizet + β7*TaxIncentiveit + β8*Lossit + 
β9*Lossit*TaxIncentiveit + β10*HighSTRit + β11*HighSTRit*Lossit + 
β12*HighSTRit*TaxIncentiveit + β13*HighSTRit*Lossit*TaxIncentiveit (11) 
 
We continue to predict a positive coefficient β9 following H1 and further predict a positive 
coefficient β13 following H2. It is important to note that we use the statutory tax rate for our 
exploration of H2. In doing so, we draw a distinction between the tax incentive at the affiliate 
level, which considers the position of the particular affiliate within the corporate group, and the 
jurisdiction’s tax rate that would apply broadly to all entities within that jurisdiction. 
Sample  
The Amadeus database contains financial and operating information on independent and 
affiliated European firms. We use unconsolidated company information from Amadeus over the 
period 2003 to 2012 for all tests. Our sample selection is detailed in Table 1.  
(insert Table 1 around here) 
Table 1 outlines that we limit our sample to controlled groups with at least one foreign 
affiliate with greater than 50 percent total (direct and indirect) ownership.27 We require that both 
the parent and this foreign affiliate be located in Europe, where Amadeus includes more detailed 
information, and that the affiliate not be missing earnings before interest and taxes (Amadeus 
variable EBIT). These criteria yield a beginning sample of 222,461 affiliate-year observations.  
To remain in the sample, we require an industry classification (NACE) code because we 
expect that profitability varies by industry and so include an industry-level shock measure. We 
																																								 																				
26	In untabulated tests, we confirm results are robust to alternatively defining HighSTR as the top 20 percent and top 
33 percent of the sample when using C or STR as the proxy for TaxIncentive.	
27 Ninety-nine percent of the affiliates in our sample are owned at least ninety percent. 
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exclude affiliated groups in banking and insurance industries because their profitability is less 
easily estimated using assets and compensation. We further require that the consolidated group 
be profitable, reporting a return on sales (∑PLBT/∑REV) of at least three percent, because 
consolidated losses create incentives to change the income shifting strategy that are unrelated to 
our research question (Stock, 2013).28 For the purposes of estimation, we require tangible fixed 
assets (TFAS) and total assets (TOAS), and compensation expense (STAF) to be positive and we 
require Age and both measures of shock (ΔGDP and ΔMktSize) for each affiliate. Affiliate-level 
data requirements and differences in reporting requirements across countries and entity types 
inevitably result in the inability to include in estimation all affiliates within a multinational 
group-year. Finally, we require ROA to be greater than or equal to -1.0. Our final sample consists 
of 59,743 affiliate-years representing 2,662 unique controlled groups, of which Loss=1 for 
11,838 affiliate-years and the remaining 47,905 affiliate-years are identified as profitable.   
Summary Statistics  
 Table 2 presents summary statistics by country. The number of affiliate-years by country 
varies from 154 in Ireland to 8,376 in Italy. We also provide averages over the sample period 
2003-2012 of key inputs to our country-year proxies. Average statutory tax rates vary by country 
from a low of 10 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia to a high of 34 percent in 
Belgium, Germany and Italy. Most countries do not allow a carryback and the maximum 
carryback period is three years (France). All sample countries except Estonia allow a 
carryforward of at least five years.  
(insert Table 2 around here) 
																																								 																				
28 We calculate consolidated return on sales for the affiliates in our sample, rather than use the consolidated figures 
available in Amadeus, to ensure that we appropriately measure the incentives and ability of the affiliates in our 
sample to achieve a shift-to-loss strategy. This approach also acknowledges that we do not have data for all affiliates 
in the corporate groups. However, results are robust to alternatively using consolidated figures to calculate the return 
on sales sample criterion. 
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 Table 3 presents summary statistics for sample affiliate-years. Measures from affiliate 
unconsolidated financial statements are winsorized at 1/99 percent. As expected given our 
sample selection, sample affiliates report a positive ROA on average. Approximately 20 percent 
of the observations report a negative EBIT (Loss=1). The average affiliate in our sample faces a 
statutory tax rate of 28.6 percent.  
(insert Table 3 around here) 
 Panels B and C present descriptive statistics for affiliates experiencing a loss and 
reporting profit, respectively. Comparing the panels in Table 3, the average loss affiliate is 
smaller than the average profitable affiliate based on TangibleAssets, CompExp and Sales but has 
a similar amount of Assets. 
Table 4 presents correlations between our income prediction variables. The correlation 
between ln(TangibleAssets) and ln(CompExp) is positive and statistically significant at 0.59; 
though concerning, this is in line with prior literature.29  
(insert Table 4 around here) 
 
IV. RESULTS 
Results of tests of hypothesis H1 
To provide baseline information, we first estimate precursors to the profit prediction 
model specified in equation (9). Table 5, Panel A presents these regressions. On a sample of 
profitable affiliates, the Cobb-Douglas specification in column (1), using earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT) as the measure of output, estimates coefficients consistent with prior research. 
Specifically, ln(TangibleAssets), ln(CompExp) and IndustryROA are positively related to 
profitability as expected and the model achieves an R2 of over 60 percent. When we measure 
																																								 																				
29 For example, Huizinga and Laeven (2008) report a correlation of 0.84 between Capital and Labor. 
25 
	
output as ROA, we expect a negative coefficient on capital because we deflate both sides by 
TangibleAssets before taking logs, and the Cobb-Douglas exponent on capital is generally 
assumed to be less than one. Consistent with this expectation, we report a negative coefficient on 
ln(TangibleAssets) in column (2). Ln(CompExp) and IndustryROA remain positively related to 
profitability. Though all of the coefficients other than ln(TangibleAssets) remain identical 
between columns (1) and (2), the R2 in column (2) falls dramatically to only 13 percent because 
the ratio ROA has significantly more variance relative to size than does the level EBIT. 
 (insert Table 5 around here) 
Finally, columns (3) and (4) introduce (ROA+1) as the measure of profitability. A 
comparison of columns (2) and (3) demonstrates that the addition of one to the ROA decreases 
the magnitude of the coefficients, but does not change the sign or significance of them. The 
purpose of adding one to ROA is to be able to include loss affiliates in the sample, and their 
inclusion, in column (4), does significantly change regression estimates. In particular, the 
importance of both ln(TangibleAssets) and C is reduced whereas IndustryROA becomes more 
important to the model. 
We test our first hypothesis in Panel B of Table 5. To the model estimated in column (4) 
of Table 5, Panel A, we add additional economic shock and intercept variables to improve the 
model’s performance for loss affiliates in our hypothesis tests. Specifically, column (1) includes 
ln(Age) and the Shock variables and column (2) includes ln(Age), the Shock variables and the 
Loss indicator, as specified in equation (9). Both these models implicitly estimate expected 
reported profit given economic shocks and traditional income tax shifting incentives. As 
expected, we estimate a negative coefficient on the Loss indicator. By including this indicator, 
the other variables better predict profitability. Specifically, the coefficient on IndustryROA 
returns to a level similar to that estimated on the all profitable sample in column (3) of Panel A. 
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Though the inclusion of the Shock variables does not dramatically improve the fit of the model, 
the inclusion of the Loss intercept variable does, increasing the model’s fit from an R2 of 9.6 
percent to 30.6 percent. 
In column (3), we estimate the full model outlined in equation (10), which interacts the 
tax incentive variable with Loss to test hypothesis H1. Though the main effect of C has a 
coefficient that is significantly negative and consistent with Column (3) of Panel A, the 
interaction of C with the Loss indicator is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level of 
statistical significance, consistent with our first hypothesis. These results suggest that while 
profitable affiliates decrease profits reported in higher tax-rate jurisdictions, firms respond to the 
incentives induced by loss affiliates to reduce the shifting of profits out of these higher tax rate 
jurisdictions, and in fact report higher unexpected profits in such jurisdictions.  
For profitable affiliates, we estimate a coefficient with respect to the composite tax 
incentive of −0.088 that translates to a semi-elasticity of -0.75 at the mean ROA, consistent with 
the past literature (Dharmapala, 2014). However, the sum of coefficients with respect to the 
composite tax rate of loss affiliates is +0.162, translating to a semi-elasticity of +1.24 at the mean 
ROA.30 Our point estimate for profitable affiliates implies that an increase of one standard 
deviation (0.047) in the tax rate incentives and mean return on assets of 13.3 is associated with a 
return on assets of 12.8, 0.5 percentage points lower. Our point estimate for unprofitable 
affiliates implies that an increase of one standard deviation in the tax rate incentives of an 
unprofitable affiliate with average return on assets of -11.6 is associated with a higher return on 
assets of -10.9, or 0.7 percentage points higher. 
																																								 																				
30 The estimates are calculated as exp[coefficient on C*change in  C + ln(mean ROA+1)]-1 and exp[(coefficient on 
C + coefficient on Loss*C)*change in C + ln(mean ROA+1)]-1, respectively. For the calculation of semi-elasticity, 
the change in C is 1%. 
27 
	
Though we provide an estimate above, interpreting differences in C is difficult. Consider 
the following simple example. For a multinational group with two similarly sized affiliates who 
are subject to the sample median statutory tax rate of 30 percent, an increase in an affiliate's own 
tax rate from 30 percent to 40 percent results in an increase in C approximately equal to the 
sample standard deviation of 0.047 used to calculate the figures above. In this simple example of 
only two affiliates in the multinational group, the same change in C for the same affiliate could 
instead be obtained by a decrease in the related affiliate's tax rate from 30 percent to 20 percent. 
If we expand the group to three similarly-sized affiliates who face the sample median statutory 
rate, the statutory rate of the affiliate in question must increase to approximately 37.5 percent or 
the statutory rate of one of its affiliates must decrease to 15 percent to achieve the same standard 
deviation in C. If we remove the assumption that the affiliates are similarly-sized, the same 
increase in C would require a larger change in a smaller affiliate (smaller change in a larger 
affiliate) because C is capital-weighted. The complexity in our very simple example 
demonstrates that the possible avenues for achieving a 0.047 increase in C multiplies as the 
number of affiliates in the group increases and/or as the size of these affiliates differs.  
Due both to the difficulty in interpreting results related to the composite tax variable, C, 
and to potential measurement error in C, we also test our hypotheses using the statutory tax 
rate.31 Table 6 presents these results and mirrors Panel B of Table 5 using STR to proxy for 
TaxIncentive.32 Results are again consistent with H1. We estimate a significantly negative 
relation between unexpected profit and the statutory tax rate for profitable affiliates but a 
																																								 																				
31 The composite tax variable requires information on all the affiliates of a multinational group to be complete. It is 
especially susceptible to mismeasurement when the missing affiliates are near the tails of the tax rate distribution. 
For example, omitted low-tax affiliates (such as haven affiliates and holding companies that may escape reporting 
requirements by having few assets or employees) create mismeasurement because affiliates nearer the middle of the 
group’s tax rate distribution (and thus having only a mild tax incentive) appear to be near the bottom of the 
distribution with a strong incentive to receive shifted income.	




significantly positive relation between unexpected profit and the statutory tax rate for loss 
affiliates. Our point estimates imply that a one percent increase in the statutory tax rate for 
profitable affiliates is associated with a 0.08 percentage point decrease in profitability, but that 
the same change in statutory rate for loss affiliates is associated with a 0.08 percent increase in 
profitability on average.33 These two sets of tests provide support for our hypothesis that the 
reported profit of loss affiliates exhibits a different relation with tax incentives than does the 
reported profit of profitable affiliates. 
(insert Table 6 around here) 
The estimates in Panel B of Table 5 and in Table 6 provides insight into differences in 
unexpected reported profit that results from a large discrete change in tax rates within a single 
country, or large differences in tax rates across countries (e.g., from entering a tax haven). 
Because the estimates involve affiliates that, if profitable, would face tax rates equal to the 
statutory tax rate but now are assumed to face a tax rate that is much lower, the estimates do not 
represent a marginal effect inherent in extant methods (i.e., those based on Hines and Rice, 1994, 
and summarized in Dharmapala, 2014). However, because the losses are likely temporary, the 
shifting response to a loss affiliate is expected to be muted relative to a permanent change in tax 
rates to zero. The estimates therefore provide a lower bound on the difference in reported income 
that is introduced by a large difference in tax rates across affiliates and suggest that multinational 
firms respond to even temporary tax rate changes when those changes are large. 
																																								 																				
33 The estimate for profitable affiliates is calculated as exp[coefficient on STR*1% + ln(mean ROA+1)]-1, which 
reflects a decrease from the average ROA of 13.30 to 13.22. The estimate for loss affiliates is calculated as 
exp[(coefficient on STR + coefficient on Loss*STR)*1% + ln(mean ROA+1)]-1, which reflects an increase from the 
average ROA of -11.56 to -11.48. 
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Results of tests of hypotheses H2  
We next test our second hypothesis, that the difference in responsiveness of unexpected 
profit to tax incentives between profitable and loss affiliates is higher for affiliates located in a 
higher-tax jurisdiction. This hypothesis considers that high-tax profitable affiliates are providers 
of shifted income while a high-tax loss affiliate may become a recipient of shifted income, 
resulting in a larger difference in responsiveness than between low-tax profitable and loss 
affiliates, which are both expected to be recipients of shifted income, on average. We test H2 by 
incorporating an indicator variable, HighSTR, into our tests of H1, as specified in equation (11). 
H2 predicts a positive coefficient on the interaction between HighSTR, Loss, and TaxIncentive.  
Table 7 presents results of our tests of H2. We use C as the TaxIncentive proxy in column 
(1) while STR measures the tax incentive in column (2). We continue to estimate a negative 
coefficient on TaxIncentive and a positive coefficient on Loss*TaxIncentive in both 
specifications. These coefficients capture, respectively, the relation for profitable and loss 
affiliates not in the highest quartile of STR. We estimate insignificant coefficients on 
HighSTR*TaxIncentive, which is consistent with the level of the statutory tax rate not affecting 
the income shifting incentives of profitable affiliates. That is, we fail to show that profitable 
high-tax affiliates have a responsiveness to income-shifting incentives that is different from the 
responsiveness of profitable low-tax affiliates.  
Consistent with H2, we estimate significantly positive coefficients on 
HighSTR*Loss*TaxIncentive.34 This result suggests that the difference in the responsiveness of 
unexpected profit to the tax incentive is largest for affiliates located in relatively high statutory 
tax rate jurisdictions. Specifically, for the estimates in column (1) using C, we estimate that a one 
																																								 																				
34 In untabulated tests, we replace HighSTR with HighC in tests where we use C as the proxy for TaxIncentive. 
Coefficients become approximately half as large, suggesting some noise in the measure. 
30 
	
percent increase in the statutory tax rate for the average loss affiliate increases reported profit 
(decreases reported loss) by 6.66 percent when the affiliate faces high tax rates but increases 
reported profit (decreases reported loss) by only 0.86 percent when the affiliate faces low tax 
rates. Thus, though experiencing a loss alters the income shifting for the average loss affiliate 
and its related profitable affiliates, the difference relative to traditional income shifting incentives 
is most pronounced for high-tax loss affiliates. 
 (insert Table 7 around here) 
 
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS 
Additional Analyses  
We extend our analysis to consider that income shifting must be multinational group-
neutral. That is, if loss affiliates are receiving more shifted income or providing less shifted 
income, profitable affiliates must balance this difference. We analyze the entire affiliated group 
and create a binary variable that indicates whether a profitable affiliate has any loss affiliates or 
is part of an all-profitable group and include this variable in equation (10). If profitable affiliates 
become less sensitive to typical tax incentives because the traditional strategy is being disrupted, 
we expect the interaction of this indicator variable with the tax incentive proxies to be positive. If 
loss affiliates are ignored in the transfer pricing strategy, with profit shifting continuing as 
normal among the profitable affiliates, we expect this coefficient to be zero. Table 8 presents 
results of estimating this equation using C and STR in turn as proxies for the tax incentive.  
(insert Table 8 around here) 
We continue to estimate a negative relation between unexpected profit and tax incentives 
for profitable firms in an all-profitable affiliated group and that this relation is significantly less 
negative (and even significantly positive) for loss affiliates in other affiliated groups. The 
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coefficient on ProfitWithLossAff*TaxIncentive is significantly positive, suggesting that profitable 
affiliates in groups with an associated loss affiliate are less sensitive to the traditional income 
shifting tax incentives. Overall these results confirm that loss affiliates are considered in the 
overall transfer pricing strategy of the multinational group and that their existence is disruptive to 
the traditional pattern of high-tax to low-tax income shifting. 
Comparing results in Table 8 to results elsewhere in the paper also provides evidence 
regarding the degree of understatement in previous research. In Panel A of Table 5, we estimate 
a coefficient for profitable affiliates of -0.095. We estimate a similar coefficient in Panel B when 
we separate the profitable affiliates from loss affiliates. However, in both of these tests, the group 
of profitable affiliates includes both those in an all-profitable group and those affiliated with a 
loss affiliate. In Table 8, when we separate these two types of profitable affiliates, we estimate a 
significantly larger coefficient (-0.176) for those in an all-profitable group. The coefficients in 
the two tables imply semi-elasticities of -0.81 and -1.50, respectively. Thus, controlling for the 
effect of loss affiliates on the incentives of their profitable affiliates almost doubles the semi-
elasticity. 
We further examine whether the presence of a loss affiliate in a multinational group-year 
biases the estimated effect of an affiliate’s tax incentives on reported profits. Specifically, we re-
estimate the first three columns (the EBIT > 0 specifications) reported in Panels A of Tables 5 
and 6 but include a group-year indicator variable equal to 1 if the affiliate has a related 
unprofitable affiliate. We interact this indicator variable with the tax incentive variable to capture 
the difference in the responsiveness to income-shifting incentives of profitable affiliates in the 
presence of loss affiliates relative to an all-profitable group. We only obtain significance on the 
interaction when using Log(ROA+1) as the dependent variable with the tax incentive variable C, 
suggesting some bias to the estimated effect of the tax incentive variable C in the presence of 
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loss affiliates. The lack of significance on the interaction when using the other dependent 
variables or STR as the tax incentive variable is perhaps not surprising given that 85 percent of 
the profitable observations in our sample are affiliated with at least one loss affiliate. 
Robustness tests  
To confirm the robustness of our results, we undertake a number of additional tests. First, 
we confirm that results are robust to an alternative measure of profit that does not include the 
effect of income shifting through debt. Using pre-tax income (Amadeus variable PLBT) instead 
of EBIT to calculate dependent variables for profit and to characterize loss affiliates, we re-
estimate all columns of both panels of Tables 5 and 6. Results are robust to measuring 
profitability with pre-tax income. We observe similar signs, magnitudes, and significance on all 
variables of interest.  
Second, we more closely follow prior literature (specifically, Huizinga and Laeven 2008) 
in two research design choices. First, we use the natural log of GDP per capita as the measure of 
productivity instead of industry-country-year ROA. We continue to include ΔGDP despite its 
higher correlation with lnGDP. Inferences remain unchanged. We observe similar signs, 
magnitudes, and significance on all variables except the tax incentive variables, the effect of 
which is larger than reported in Tables 5 and 6. In the final specification where we test H1, we 
estimate a coefficient on C of -0.1825 (p-value < 0.01) or on STR of -0.2298 (p-value < 0.01). 
Similarly, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between C (STR) and Loss when using 
lnGDP as the measure of productivity is 0.3802 (p-value < 0.01) (0.2909, p-value <0.01), which 
is higher than that reported in Table 5 (Table 6). We also confirm that results are robust to 
assuming the tax deductibility of income shifting costs in calculating C. Specifically, in tests of 
H1 using this alternative calculation of C, we find the same signs and significance, and very 
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similar magnitudes, on all control variables. We estimate a coefficient on C of -0.0849 (p-value < 
0.01) and a coefficient of 0.2284 (p-value < 0.01) on the interaction between C and Loss.   
Third, instead of calculating an industry-country-year measure of productivity 
(IndustryROA), we include industry-country-year fixed effects. The use of industry-country-year 
fixed effects precludes the use of the productivity measure (IndustryROA), the shock variables 
(∆GDP and ∆MktSize), and the country-year tax incentive variable (STR). We therefore can only 
estimate and discuss results using the tax incentive variable C. Using industry-country-year fixed 
effects, we obtain similar signs and significance on all variables. We obtain higher magnitudes 
for the effect of labor on reported profits (e.g., 0.0032, p-value < 0.01 in our test of H1) and for 
the interaction between C and Loss (0.3878, p-value < 0.01), however all other magnitudes are 
similar to those reported in Table 5.  
Next, we aim to ensure that our results are not affected by our inability to observe data 
for all affiliates. Thus, we limit our sample to multinationals with only affiliates for which we 
have data. Imposing this restriction drastically reduces our sample to 9,442 affiliate-years when 
using the tax incentive variable C and 10,044 affiliate-years when using the tax incentive 
variable STR. Nonetheless, estimating our tests on this sub-sample generates similar inferences 
as those reported in Tables 5 and 6. When testing H1, we estimate a larger magnitude for the 
effect of the tax incentive variable C on reported profits (-0.1574, p-value < 0.01) when 
restricting our sample to fully-observable group-years and on the interaction between C and Loss 
(0.4563, p-value = 0.04), however the economic significance of the interaction is weaker. We 
observe a similar pattern of results on STR (-0.0883, p-value < 0.01) and the interaction between 
STR and Loss (0.3758, p-value = 0.02). 
We next test the sensitivity of our results to our treatment of affiliates with very small 
profits, which likely includes affiliates that would have been unprofitable absent income shifting. 
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In untabulated robustness tests, we omit affiliates with very small profits, defined as affiliate-
years reporting ROS below one percent, from the sample and re-estimate equation (10). Results 
for H1 are robust to eliminating these observations. This test is not sensitive to alternative small 
profit thresholds, including ROS of less than 1.5 percent or 0.5 percent. If we instead include an 
indicator variable for observations with small profits, we continue to find a positive and 
significant coefficient on the interaction between the loss indicator variable and tax incentives, 
consistent with results reported in Tables 5 and 6. Further, we find a negative and significant 
coefficient on the indicator variable for small profits and a positive and significant coefficient on 
the interaction between the small profit indicator and tax incentives, consistent with these small 
profit observations behaving similar to loss affiliates in H1. The interaction between the small 
profit indicator and tax incentives results are robust to alternative ROS thresholds except 0.5 
percent, where only 1,360 observations meet the small profit definition.  
We also group small profit affiliates together with small loss affiliates using the threshold 
of plus or minus one percent ROS. Dropping all small ROS affiliates from the sample and re-
estimating equation (10), we continue to find results consistent with H1 for loss affiliates (now 
defined as reporting ROS less than -1 percent). Including an indicator for the group of small 
ROS affiliates and the interaction between this indicator and tax incentives, we continue to find a 
positive and significant interaction between the loss indicator variable and tax incentives, 
consistent with H1, as well as a positive and significant interaction between the small ROS 
indicator variable and tax incentives, suggesting that the group of small ROS affiliates behave 
like loss affiliates. These results are robust to using 1.5 percent and 0.5 percent bands of ROS as 
the threshold for defining small profit/loss. 
We also consider the sensitivity of the results to our decision to require group ROS to be 
greater than or equal to three percent. We test three alternative group ROS cut-offs: 2 percent, 1 
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percent, and 0 percent. These alternative sample selection criteria do not affect results. In all 
specifications, we continue to find signs, magnitudes, and significance of all variables consistent 
with those reported in Tables 5 and 6. Results are also largely unaffected when using these same 
cut-offs and reported ROS from the parent company’s consolidated financial statements, instead 
of calculating a group-wide ROS based on affiliate-level financials.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our paper studies a tax-motivated income shifting strategy that exploits losses earned by 
unprofitable affiliates of a multinational group. By shifting income from profitable affiliates to 
loss affiliates, multinational corporations can reduce their worldwide tax burden. However, there 
are considerable costs associated with this strategy such that its usage should not be assumed. 
Thus, we test whether a shift-to-loss strategy is employed on average. We also consider which 
loss affiliates report the largest difference in unexpected profit. 
We first provide evidence that the sign on the coefficient for the tax incentive variable 
reverses for loss affiliates relative to profitable affiliates, suggesting that these affiliates report a 
significantly smaller loss than otherwise predicted. This result is consistent with use of a shift-to-
loss strategy. Next, we find that loss affiliates in jurisdictions in the highest-quartile of statutory 
tax rates report a more significant difference in the responsiveness of their unexpected profit to 
tax incentives than do loss affiliates in lower quartiles of STR. Finally, we further verify use of a 
shift-to-loss strategy by documenting that the profitable affiliates of loss affiliates are less 
sensitive to the traditional income shifting strategy than are profitable affiliates in all-profitable 




The estimation methods used in our study allow for the inclusion of unprofitable affiliates 
in future income shifting studies. Specifically, using return on assets plus one allows for the 
inclusion of most observable affiliate-years while keeping the traditional log-log specification 
used in many prior studies. Further, we include several proxies for economic shock that improve 
the explanatory power of the models when including unprofitable affiliates. We look forward to 
future research using these methods, for example to explore the methods multinational firms 
undertake to shift profits to loss affiliates or to consider the costs associated with undertaking 
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We present below the calculation of the tax incentive variable C and equilibrium profits shifted 
using equation (3) for two cases: (1) all affiliates are profitable, and (2) affiliate i is profitable but 
affiliates j and k report a pre-shifting loss. The change in income shifting behavior between the 
two cases, given by equation (5), is computed for all three affiliates, assuming the loss affects the 
expected present value of the tax rate for an affiliate as we model through θ. We make the size of 
the loss affiliates the same to simplify the exercise. Throughout these examples we use capital as 
the proxy for economic activity K and hold the cost shifting parameter, a, constant at 10. 
 
Affiliate: Ai  Aj  Ak  Total 
Case 1: all affiliates profitable 
Pre-tax economic profits, ρ 7.00  3.00  3.00  13.00 
Capital, K 105.00  60.00  60.00  225.00 
Tax rate, τ 0.35  0.25  0.40   
Effect of loss on tax rate, θ 1.00  1.00  1.00   
After-tax profits absent shifting 4.55  2.25  1.80  8.60 
Tax incentive, C 0.013  -0.087  0.063   
Equilibrium income shifted in (out), ψ (0.14)  0.52  (0.38)  0.00 
Cost of equilibrium income shifting 0.00  0.02  0.01  0.04 
Reported after-tax profit (loss), π 4.46  2.62  1.56  8.64 
        
Case 2: affiliates j and k have losses and an assumed θ of one third 
Pre-tax economic profits, ρ 7.00  (  3.00)  (  3.00)  1.00 
Capital, K 105.00  60.00  60.00  225.00 
Tax rate, τ 0.35  0.25  0.40   
Effect of loss on tax rate, θ 1.00  0.33  0.33   
After-tax profit (loss) absent shifting 4.55  (2.75)  (2.60)  (0.80) 
Tax incentive updated for effect of losses 0.129  -0.138  -0.080   
Equilibrium income shifted in (out), ψ (1.36)  0.83  0.53  0.00 
Cost of equilibrium income shifting 0.09  0.06  0.02  0.17 
Reported after-tax profit (loss), π 3.58  (2.05)  (2.17)  (0.64) 
        
Difference between shifting in Case 2 and Case 1 
Equilibrium income shifting, ψCase 2 - ψCase 1 (1.22)  0.31  0.91  0.00 
Difference in π due to shift-to-loss strategy 
(applying ψCase 1 to Case 2 ρ and θ)  
(0.88)  0.25  0.78  0.15 
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We calculate C as defined by Huizina and Laeven (2008) as the capital-weighted differential 
statutory tax rate faced by each affiliate. A negative value of C suggests that the group’s tax 
incentives are to shift income into the affiliate (net recipient of shifted profit). For example, in 
Case 1, Affiliate j has a lower tax rate than the other affiliates, and the resulting value of C is 
negative, reflecting an incentive to shift income into that affiliate. In contrast, a positive value of 
C suggests that the group’s tax incentives are to shift income out of the affiliate (net provider of 
shifted profit). For example, in Case 1, the two relatively high tax affiliates i and k have positive 
values of C and negative equilibrium income shifting. When taking into account the effect of 
losses in Case 2, the tax incentive becomes stronger (i.e., more positive) for the profitable 
affiliate i to shift income out relative to Case 1. In Case 1, the tax incentive for the profitable 
relatively high-tax affiliate k suggests an incentive to shift income out, but when k incurs a loss 
in Case 2, the equilibrium shifting strategy changes due to a tax incentive to shift income out. As 
a relatively low-tax affiliate, affiliate j exhibits a tax incentive to receive shifted income in both 
Case 1 and Case 2. However, the response is larger when affiliate j incurs a loss.  
The reported after-tax profit (loss), π, is calculated as economic profit, ρ, plus income shifted, ψ, 
less taxes at rate θτ and the cost of shifting, a/2*ψ2/ρ. 
 
These calculations ignore the costs of 
changing the income distribution strategy to take advantage of the losses. The difference in π due 
to the implementation of a to shift-to-loss strategy is calculated as the difference between π in 
Case 2 and π that would have been reported if a traditional strategy were still employed (i.e., ρ, θ 
and τ in Case 2 coupled with ψ in Case 1). 
Comparing the two scenarios reveals two phenomena. First, comparing the equilibrium income 
shifting of affiliate j across the two cases, the numerical examples demonstrate that more income 
is shifted into an affiliate when it experiences a loss than when it is a profitable relatively low-tax 
affiliate. Second, comparing the change in income shifting between Case 1 and Case 2 across 
loss affiliates with different statutory tax rates, the numerical examples demonstrate that 
affiliates with relatively higher statutory tax rates (in this example, affiliate k) reported a larger 
change in income shifting when moving from profit to loss than affiliates with lower statutory 
tax rates (here, affiliate j). This example is consistent with our first hypothesis. 
In this example, the difference in profitability from altering the income shifting distribution from 
that reported in Case 1 to the new optimum reflected in Case 2 creates additional after-tax profits 
for the group of 0.15 (note, if no income shifting had occurred, the after-tax profits would have 
been -0.80). If, in Case 2, only affiliate k experiences an economic loss of -3.00, but affiliate j 
continued to be profitable as in Case 1, then the benefit of altering the income shifting strategy 
from Case 1 to the new optimal solution is 0.16. On the other hand, if only affiliate j experiences 
the loss, rather than affiliate k, the benefit of altering the income shifting strategy from Case 1 to 
the new optimum declines to 0.06. This decline reflects that fact that affiliate j was already a 
relatively low tax affiliate whereas changing from shifting out of affiliate k under the all-
profitable case, to shifting into affiliate k when it has a loss yields a much larger improvement in 
after-tax profits. If the costs of altering the strategy are fixed, at say 0.10, then the firm in this 
example would not alter its income shifting strategy in the face of only the low tax-rate affiliate 
experiencing a loss, whereas it will alter its strategy in the face of the higher tax-rate affiliate 
experiencing a loss. On average, firms will be more likely to alter their income shifting strategy 










The affiliated firm sample consists of a total of 59,743 European affiliate-years over the period 2003-2012 with at least one foreign affiliated firm also located in 
Europe and sufficient data from Amadeus and the European Commission for estimation. Of these, we characterize 11,838 affiliate-years as unprofitable (Loss=1) 
and 47,905 affiliate-years as profitable (Loss=0). 
 




Table 2: Sample Composition and Measures by Country 
	
 
The sample consists of a total of 59,743 European affiliate-years 2003-2012. This table provides the number of affiliate-year observations by country, the number of 









The sample consists of a total of 59,743 European affiliate-years 2003-2012. EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes. ROA is EBIT scaled by Assets, where Assets is 
total assets. TangibleAssets is total fixed assets. CompExp is compensation expense. ln(EBIT) is the natural log of EBIT, ln(ROA) is the natural log of ROA, ln(ROA+1) is 
the natural log of ROA plus one, ln(TangibleAssets) is the natural log of TangibleAssets, and ln(CompExp) is the natural log of CompExp. IndustryROA is country-year-
industry median ROA for all observable companies in Amadeus. Age equals year t minus the year the affiliate first appears in the Amadeus database. ΔGDP is GDP in 
year t less GDP in year t-1, scaled by GDP in year t-1. ΔMktSize is the country-industry-year sum of affiliate and standalone firm sales in year t less the sum in year t-1, 
scaled by 1,000,000. Loss is set to 1 if affiliate EBIT is less than zero. C is the capital-weighted differential statutory tax rate between the affiliate and all related affiliates 
































ln denotes the natural log of the term in parentheses. EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes. ROA is EBIT scaled by Assets, where Assets is total assets. TangibleAssets is total 
fixed assets. CompExp is compensation expense. IndustryROA is country-year-industry median ROA of all observable companies in Amadeus. Age equals year t minus the year the 
affiliate first appears in the Amadeus database. ΔGDP is GDP in year t less GDP in year t-1, scaled by GDP in year t-1. ΔMktSize is the country-industry-year sum of all firm sales 
in year t less the sum in year t-1, scaled by 1,000,000. Loss is set to 1 if EBIT is less than zero. C is a capital-weighted differential statutory tax rate between the affiliate and all 







Table 5: Tests Using the Tax Incentive Variable C 
Panel A: Income Shifting Model 
 
ln(π) = β0 + β1*ln(TangibleAssets) + β2*ln(CompExp) + β3*IndustryROA + β4*C	
				
  
This table estimates the profit prediction model on the sample of 45,009 European affiliate-years 2003-2012 with at least one foreign affiliated firm also located in Europe 
and sufficient data from Amadeus and the European Commission for estimation for which EBIT is greater than zero in Columns (1)-(3) as well as on the sample of 56,087 
affiliates with sufficient data for estimation in Column (4). EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes. ln(EBIT) is the natural log of EBIT. ROA is EBIT scaled by Assets, 
where Assets is total assets. ln(ROA) is the natural log of ROA. ln(ROA+1) is the natural log of ROA plus 1. ln(TangibleAssets) is the natural log of total fixed assets. 
ln(CompExp) is the natural log of compensation expense. IndustryROA is a measure of country-year-industry median ROA. C is a capital-weighted differential statutory tax 
rate between the affiliate and all related affiliates in the same group-year. All specifications report standard errors clustered by group. *, **, and *** represent one-tailed 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 5: Tests Using the Tax Incentive Variable C 
Panel B: Test of the Effect of Losses on Tax-Motivated Income Shifting (H1) 
 






This table estimates tests of H1 on a sample of 56,087 European affiliate-years 2003-2012 with at least one foreign affiliated firm also located in Europe and sufficient 
data from Amadeus and the European Commission for estimation. The dependent variable is ln(ROA+1), the natural log of EBIT scaled by Assets plus 1. 
ln(TangibleAssets) is that natural log of total fixed assets. ln(CompExp) is the natural log of compensation expense. IndustryROA is a measure of country-year-industry 
median ROA. ln(Age) is the natural log of Age, measured as year t minus the year the affiliate first appears in the Amadeus database. ΔGDP is GDP in year t less GDP in 
year t-1, scaled by GDP in year t-1. ΔMktSize is the country-industry-year sum of all affiliate and standalone firm sales in year t less the sum in year t-1, scaled by 
1,000,000. C is the capital-weighted average differential statutory tax rate between the affiliate and all other related affiliates in the same group-year. Loss is set to 1 if affiliate 
EBIT is less than zero. All specifications report standard errors clustered by group. *, **, and *** represent one-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.
Table 6: Test of the Effect of Losses on Tax-Motivated Income Shifting Using the Tax Incentive Variable STR (H1) 
 






This table estimates tests of H1 on a sample of 59,743 European affiliate-years 2003-2012 with at least one foreign affiliated firm also located in Europe and sufficient 
data from Amadeus and the European Commission for estimation. The dependent variable is ln(ROA+1), the natural log of EBIT scaled by Assets plus 1. 
ln(TangibleAssets) is that natural log of total fixed assets. ln(CompExp) is the natural log of compensation expense. IndustryROA is a measure of country-year-industry 
median ROA. ln(Age) is the natural log of Age, measured as year t minus the year the affiliate first appears in the Amadeus database. ΔGDP is GDP in year t less GDP 
in year t-1, scaled by GDP in year t-1. ΔMktSize is the country-industry-year sum of all affiliate and standalone firm sales in year t less the sum in year t-1, scaled by 
1,000,000. STR is the mean-centered country-year statutory tax rate. Loss is set to 1 if affiliate EBIT is less than zero. All specifications report standard errors clustered by 
group. *, **, and *** represent one-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 7: Tests of the Effect of High Tax Rates on the Shift-to-Loss Strategy (H2) 
 
ln(ROA+1) = β0 + β1*ln(TangibleAssets) + β2*ln(CompExp) + β3*IndustryROA + β4*Shock + 






This table estimates tests of H2 on the sample of 59,743 European affiliate-years 2003-2012 with at least one foreign 
affiliated firm also located in Europe and sufficient data from Amadeus and the European Commission for estimation in 
Column (2) as well as on the sample of 56,087 affiliates with sufficient data for estimation in Column (1). ln(ROA+1) is 
the natural log of ROA plus 1. ROA is EBIT scaled by Assets, where EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes and Assets 
is total assets. ln(TangibleAssets) is the natural log of total fixed assets. ln(CompExp) is the natural log of compensation 
expense. IndustryROA is a measure of country-year-industry median ROA.  ln(Age) is the natural log of Age, measured as 
year t minus the year the affiliate first appears in the Amadeus database. ΔGDP is GDP in year t less GDP in year t-1, 
scaled by GDP in year t-1. ΔMktSize is the country-industry-year sum of all affiliate and standalone firm sales in year t 
less the sum in year t-1, scaled by 1,000,000. TaxIncentive is C in column (1) and STR in column (2). C is a capital-
weighted differential statutory tax rate between the affiliate and all related affiliates in the same group-year. STR is the mean-
centered country-year statutory tax rate. Loss is set to 1 if affiliate EBIT is less than zero. HighSTR is an indicator variable 
set to 1 if the affiliate’s STR is in the top quartile by year. All specifications report standard errors clustered by group. *, 
**, and *** represent one-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 8: Tests of the Effect of Losses on the Affiliated Group 
 
ln(ROA+1) = β1*ln(TangibleAssets) + β2*ln(CompExp) + β3*IndustryROA + β4*Shock + β5*TaxIncentive 






This table estimates the effect of losses on the affiliated group on the sample of 59,743 European affiliate-years 2003-2012 
with at least one foreign affiliated firm also located in Europe and sufficient data from Amadeus and the European 
Commission for estimation in Column (2) as well as on the sample of 56,087 affiliates with sufficient data for estimation 
in Column (1). ). ln(ROA+1) is the natural log of ROA plus 1. ROA is EBIT scaled by Assets, where EBIT is earnings 
before interest and taxes and Assets is total assets. ln(TangibleAssets) is the natural log of total fixed assets. ln(CompExp) 
is the natural log of compensation expense. IndustryROA is a measure of country-year-industry median ROA. ln(Age) is 
the natural log of Age, measured as year t minus the year the affiliate first appears in the Amadeus database. ΔGDP is 
GDP in year t less GDP in year t-1, scaled by GDP in year t-1. ΔMktSize is the country-industry-year sum of all affiliate 
and standalone firm sales in year t less the sum in year t-1, scaled by 1,000,000. TaxIncentive is C in column (1) and STR 
in column (2). C is a capital-weighted differential statutory tax rate between the affiliate and all related affiliates in the same 
group-year. STR is the mean-centered country-year statutory tax rate. AllProfit is an indicator variable set to 1 if all affiliates in 
the same multinational group-year have EBIT greater than or equal to zero. Loss is an indicator variable set to 1 if affiliate 
EBIT is less than zero. ProfitWithLossAff is an indicator variable set to 1 if affiliate EBIT is greater than or equal to zero 
but there is a related affiliated in the same multinational group-year with EBIT less than zero. We suppress the intercept 
when estimating these models. All specifications report standard errors clustered by group. *, **, and *** represent one-
tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
